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Future enlargements are not expected to have a major impact on the overall cohesion budget. However, under the European Commission’s July 2025 proposal<\/strong>, cohesion spending as a percentage of the 2028\u201334 EU budget<\/strong> is expected to decrease<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The accession of poorer countries<\/strong> will lower the average EU GDP per capita<\/strong>, leading some regions to move into less favorable eligibility categories, as their GDP per capita (as a % of EU average)<\/strong> rises.<\/p>\n This will result in reduced cohesion allocations<\/strong> for certain regions and member states.<\/p>\n Both a “small enlargement” and a “large enlargement” are expected to reduce national cohesion allocations by 15%\u201321%<\/strong> for some current member states.<\/p>\n The distribution of costs<\/strong> will depend on whether eligibility rules<\/strong> are revised. For example, if less weight is given to GDP per capita and more to other indicators (e.g., demographics, climate, economic dynamics), the impact could shift.<\/p>\n According to the 2024 High-Level Expert Report on the Future of Cohesion Policy<\/strong>, some funds could be reserved to offset negative effects of enlargement \u2014 for example, in border regions<\/strong> or areas affected by supply chain disruptions<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Changes to cohesion funding are not just bookkeeping \u2014 they affect the development potential of all regions<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The challenge is to strengthen regional cohesion<\/strong> without sacrificing solidarity<\/strong> with countries needing support.<\/p>\n This is a rule that limits the maximum amount<\/strong> a country can receive from Cohesion Policy funds<\/strong> (ERDF, ESF+, Cohesion Fund) in each seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).<\/p>\n It states that no country can receive more than 2.3% of its GDP<\/strong> (on average per year) from cohesion resources.<\/p>\n It doesn’t matter how low the GDP per capita<\/strong> is or how great the country\u2019s needs \u2014 funding is capped at 2.3% of its GDP<\/strong> (at current prices).<\/p>\n Two main reasons:<\/p>\n It prevents low-GDP countries<\/strong> from receiving very high levels of funding \u2014 even when they would qualify for more under the \u201cBerlin formula.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n Examples:<\/strong> These nine candidate countries have very low GDPs<\/strong>. So, the 2.3% rule results in low per capita funding<\/strong>, even lower than past enlargement waves (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czechia).<\/p>\n This makes accession fiscally unattractive<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Many therefore propose:<\/p>\n For Greek audiences: A progressive approach<\/strong> seeks fair redistribution<\/strong>, not cuts that harm small and medium-sized producers.<\/p>\n The 2.3% GDP cap means an EU country cannot receive more than 2.3% of its GDP<\/strong> annually in Cohesion Policy funding \u2014 regardless of its needs.<\/p>\n This creates a ceiling<\/strong> on funding, even for countries with real needs and ready projects.<\/p>\n For SouthEast Europe countries<\/span><\/strong>, this means the EU must adopt fairer rules<\/strong> that consider actual needs<\/strong>, not just numerical limits<\/strong>.<\/p>\n If new member states do not gain full access<\/strong> to direct payments under CAP<\/strong> immediately (as in previous enlargements), and if they pay into the EU budget<\/strong> from year one, some could end up in a worse fiscal position<\/strong> after accession<\/strong>.<\/p>\n In such cases, temporary fiscal compensations<\/strong> should be included in the Accession Treaties<\/strong>, as in past enlargements (e.g., Iberian and Eastern Europe), such as:<\/p>\n A temporary increase to 4%<\/strong> (as in 2000\u20132006) is a potential solution \u2014 but requires strict absorption monitoring<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The accession of Ukraine inevitably requires<\/strong> a thorough review of coherence across EU funding sources<\/strong> for its reconstruction. It\u2019s vital to avoid double-funding<\/strong> or substitution of grants<\/strong>, as seen during parallel use of RRF (Recovery Fund)<\/strong> and Cohesion Funds<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Ukraine’s accession will bring major challenges<\/strong> for the CAP.<\/p>\n If the current CAP budget is maintained and comparable payments are made to new members (even slightly lower), all current member states would face a ~15% cut in their national allocations<\/strong>.<\/p>\n With a proposed \u20ac90 billion cut<\/strong> to the 2028\u201334 CAP budget, national allocations may be reduced by over 25%<\/strong>, assuming all else remains equal.<\/p>\n These forecasts intensify resistance to enlargement<\/strong>. Current global conditions \u2014 tariff wars, failed WTO talks, farmer protests, low food prices, and war effects \u2014 make the European Commission\u2019s proposed CAP cuts politically very difficult<\/strong> and facing justified opposition<\/strong>.<\/p>\n If EU resources are not significantly increased<\/strong> and CAP\/cohesion rules not revised<\/strong>, then:<\/p>\n This leaves over \u20ac300 billion in “unallocated” funds<\/strong> \u2014 which will be a key negotiation point.<\/p>\n Some could be used to:<\/p>\n Lifting the 2.3% GDP cap<\/strong> for enlargement countries may also be considered.<\/p>\n Given that the likely 2028\u20132034 MFF scenario is \u201cno new enlargement\u201d<\/strong>, resources freed by reduced CAP and cohesion allocations can be redirected to other priorities<\/strong>, as in the new EC<\/span> proposal:<\/p>\n Enlargement is not a technical exercise \u2014 it’s a political choice<\/strong> about the kind of Europe we want<\/strong>:<\/p>\n A historical Europe of solidarity, development, and democracy<\/strong> from the Atlantic to the Urals \u2014 The progressive response<\/strong> is clear:
\nWhat is the \u201c2.3% of GDP\u201d Rule?<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Why does this limit exist?<\/strong><\/h4>\n
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What is the practical effect of the rule?<\/strong><\/h4>\n
\nBulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Greece have often hit the limit.
\nFor Ukraine<\/strong>, due to its very low nominal GDP, this rule significantly restricts<\/strong> the funding it could receive \u2014 despite its massive reconstruction needs<\/strong>.<\/p>\n
\nWhy is this a problem for the Western Balkans & Ukraine?<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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\nThe revision of the CAP<\/strong> affects not only Ukraine but all EU<\/span> farmers<\/strong>, food production, incomes, and the agri-food sector.<\/p>\nSummary:<\/strong><\/h4>\n
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\n2.11.2 IMPACTS ON THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Potential Solutions:<\/strong><\/h4>\n
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\nGeneral Observations:<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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\nFinal Note:<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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\nA Europe of <\/i>austerity<\/i><\/strong>, <\/i>hard borders<\/i><\/strong>, <\/i>fear<\/i><\/strong>, <\/i>inequality<\/i><\/strong>, and <\/i>militarization<\/i><\/strong>.<\/i><\/p>\n
\nA more democratic, peaceful, and just Europe<\/strong>, with more common resources<\/strong> for